Are descriptors like “good” and “evil” pointing at real, objective features of the world? Surprisingly, despite the weirdness of moral facts, most philosophers would say “yes.” Why? Well…morality might not be the only thing in those crosshairs…😬
Cuneo on Naturalism:
Be that as it may, what I would like to point out is that, if naturalism implies that there are no moral facts and if this claim implies that there are no epistemic facts, then naturalism gives us strong reason to believe that there are no epistemic facts. If, however, my overarching argument is correct and there are epistemic facts, then we have good reason to believe that naturalism—at least of the kind that is driving the arguments we’ve considered—is false. The apparent price of tying naturalism so closely to moral antirealism is, I suggest, to increase the vulnerability of the naturalist project.
The Normative Web - An Argument for Moral Realism (Cuneo, 2007) - https://www.betterworldbooks.com/product/detail/The-Normative-Web–An-Argument-for-Moral-Realism-9780199581382
Ethics: Inventing Right & Wrong (Mackie, 1977) - https://www.betterworldbooks.com/product/detail/Ethics—Inventing-Right-and-Wrong-9780140219579
Metaethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012) - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/
Moral Anti-Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021) - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/
Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won’t Work (Cowie, 2014) - https://christophercowie.files.wordpress.com/2020/10/why-companions-in-guilt-arguments-wont-work.pdf